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The Transcendental Irish Republic, The Dream of 
Diaspora 
J . Bouyer Bell 
International Analysis Center, New York, New York 
Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God 
and of the dead generations from which she 
receives her old tradition of nationhood, Irelan d, 
through us, summons her children to her flag an d 
strikes for freedom. 
. . . having patiently perfected her discipline, 
having resolutely waited for the right mome nt to 
reveal itself, she no seizes that moment. and 
supported by her exiled children in American an d 
by gallant allies in Europe, buy relying in the firs t 
on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence 
of victory . . . 
Proclamation of the Irish Republic on Easte r 
Monday, 1916 
As the seven signers of the Easter Proclamation stressed, 
every generation of the Irish people have asserted their right to 
national freedom and sovereignty- and six times in the pr evious 
three hundred years had done so by resort to arms. In April 1916 
the Republic, virtually established in all Irish hearts, had at last 
been declared before the GPO on Sackville Street in Dublin, had 
come home and into reality, a dream made manifest: and , thus, 
Ireland was a nation once again. Abroad, for over a century, 
various exiled institutional forms had been shaped to contain. to 
maintain, and to encourage the Republican dream, the Republic . 
The pedestrian label of"govemment-in-exile" falls far short of the 
richness and ambiguity of that dream or the singular peculiarity 
of the Irish Republic. Most governments-in-exile have been quite 
straight forward . There are, for example, those driven from power 
by domestic or foreign enemies. forced to take up residence 
abroad, there maintaining a claim to legitimacy and orch estrat-
ing a return to power. Since the quarreling high kings of Celtic 
Ireland. there had never been an Irish-Irish regime an d never. 
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ever. an island united under effective. independent, c~ntral 
control: - since 1800 Ireland had been an integral part of the 
United Kingdom. The other main variant of diaspora governance, 
rebels with pretentious to recognition declaring their existence 
as tactic from a liberated zone or, if need be, from abroad as a step 
toward power, too, was largely if not entirely inappropriate. 
Island risings were crushed, often in the egg, before the forms of 
governance were necessary: and the Irish rebels abroad only 
from time to time focused on a "government" as tactic being more 
concerned with martial tactics to erode British power. Thus, the 
Jong Irish experience is not so easy to slot, not even a sure entry 
in exile government unless an analyst opts to concentrate on one 
brief moment, a moment never of interest to the rebels and 
seldom even to the historian. 
The Irish revolutionary experience indicates the elusive 
nature oflegitimacy. the right to act for the nation- the essential 
foundation of governance no matter the form. For the Irish the 
crucial focus was the right to rule rather than the power to 
govern. Presently, few life-presidents or dictatorial generals 
possess more than the power to coerce. In exile most kings and 
dictators seldom possess more than the loyalty of their immedi-
ate family and contaminated cronies. Even monarchs, divinely 
chosen. found in time their legitimacy eroded unless they ruled 
in reality - after a decade in the diaspora the world moved on. 
their court grew quaint, their value debased. Somehow even after 
generations, after repeated failure. after schism and betrayal, the 
Irish Republic remained a luminous. validating ideal - a reality 
in Irish rebel hearts: a dream variously, vaguely, institutional-
ized, but a dream that conferred moral legitimacy on the believ-
ers. on each new generation of crusaders. 
The Irish revolutionary tradition, rich, various, and per-
sistent, a tradition easily noted, if in attenuated form, in the 
present island violence, can be traced to almost any focal point 
of analysis over a millennium. More reasonably, more specifi-
cally, the modem example, militant Irish Republicanism. arises 
from the dual currents of republican nationalism and the ideals 
of the age of reason. 
These compelling ideals and ideas mixed with island 
particularism, past grievance, and inherited assumptions, in-
spired varying categories of rebels over the generations. The 
founding father of Irish Republicanism was Wolfe Tone, middle 
class, a Protestant. who saw in England the cause of all his 
country's ills and in physical force - violence - the necessary 
means to achieve a united Ireland of Protestant, Catholic, and 
Dissenter, an Ireland free and prosperous and. naturally. Re-
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publican. His United Irishmen. a brief alliance of all three, failed 
to establish the Republic and Tone died in a Dublin prison cell. 
Robert Emmet failed and was hanged in 1803. The Young Ireland 
rebels of 1848, the island's contribution to the great year of 
European revolution. failed as well. Still the concomitant rural 
disorders continued to offer both challenge to the authorities and 
the propertied classes and also an opportunity for radicals and 
Republicans. Restrictions on Catholics engendered further griev-
ance as did the inequities of the social and economic structure. 
Irish society was. of course, far more complex than the emerging 
patriot histozy depicting an evil England, selfish, arrogant. 
represented by absentee Protestant ascendancy, an alien gov-
ernment in Dublin Castle. 1This was the exploited Ireland of 
evictions. transported f elans, malnourished peasants. and the 
gibbet. This was the Ireland that Republican rebels sought to 
destroy- and generation after generation there were ample real 
not imagined grievances to inspire such rebellion. 
In the broadest sense the London center of the United 
Kingdom increasingly in the nineteenth centuzy made efforts to 
ameliorate the more pressing Irish grievances relating to land 
and religion and political participation and in the process to co-
opt the more reasonable Catholic inhabitants. This process was 
accelerated by Irish moderates, often speaking in radical rheto-
ric, using all manner of political weapons and the threat of worse. 
And so, again, in the broadest sense the histozy of nineteenth 
centuzy Ireland was one of accommodation to British power. to 
modernization, to central values, made swifter, if not possible, by 
vast demographic and social changes, by the self-interest of 
many of the Irish, by the seeming inevitable tides ofhistozy that 
swept away not only old grievance but also old languages. old 
habits and institutions. Victorian progress was at play on a 
small. isolated, island backwater. The Irish rebels, nationalists, 
Republicans, descendants of Tone. read histozy differently and. 
most important of all. found an unwanted, horrid ally, a deadly, 
unknown fungus, phytophthora inf es tans. 
In 1841 the population of Ireland was 8,175,124, the 
most densely populated country in Europe despite steady emi-
gration to Britain and the United States. The rural poor. mostly 
Catholic, often, especially in the West. recent Irish-speakers, 
twenty-five percent of the island population spoke only Irish in 
1801, had prospered to a degree on potato cultivation. Vezy small 
holdings could feed a family. Fed on potatoes and milk and 
sometimes fish the Irish were the healthiest poor in Europe. And 
when blight came or fish or milk were short, they lived on the 
margin. This rural. residue Gaelic culture may have been ulti-
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mately doomed in ethnocentric Europe by the iron laws of 
economics. English had replaced Irish at remarkable speed. 
Emigrations was growing as an outlet for those willing and able 
to leave. There was narrowing ground in Europe for the isolate, 
the marginal, the separate; but no one saw that disaster not 
progress would accelerate the process. On September 9, 1845, 
the first report appeared of the potato blight. the mysterious 
fungus disease. There had been other blights but none so 
complete, so devastating as this - twice as bad in 1846, a little 
better in 1847, and then worse in 1848-1849. Between 1845and 
1851 the population declined by 2,225,000 largely as a result of 
disease (especially cholera). starvation. and emigration. The 
death figures, always. still in dispute (750,000, 1,000,000, 
1,500.000) only indicate the scope of the horror. Ireland was 
changed, utterly changed, and no place more so than in the 
hearts of those who survived, those at the edge of risk -
articulate nationalists, the Catholic emigrants, the idealists. In 
America the sutvivors poured in- 250,000 in 1851. Year after 
year. they arrived. embittered, ruined, exhausted, without re-
sources, aliens in a strange land. country folk in cruel cities. They 
believed then and many of their heirs do now that the famine was 
not a social necessity but political oppression. 
England, Perfidious Albion, the source of all Ireland's ills, 
had been revealed as a dark, Satanic power, had destroyed an 
ancient bucolic, Gaelic culture. "Progress" was but the propa-
ganda face of Victorian oppression and imperial exploitation. 
After the famine some of the Irish might have faith in rural 
agitation, barn burning, cattle maiming, at best parochial, 
parish nationalism. and others in constitutional politics, mon-
ster meetings, leagues and elections. Some, soon many, identi-
fied Irish nationalism with Catholic grievance. 2 
The Irish Republicans, adamantly separatist, did not. 
They saw concession, especially to Catholics, as co-option by the 
oppressor. They assumed on the evidence of the nation's troub-
led history that Britain had no right to rule. The United Kingdom 
had been united by force and must so be destroyed. Constitu-
tional or parliamentary means were ultimately insufficient. 
Increasingly the alienated, especially but not solely in the huge 
Irish diaspora in the United States, felt that Ireland could only be 
a nation once again by recourse to physical force. And physical 
force would have to be more effectively organized and deployed 
than had been the case in previous futile risings, in the sporadic 
agitation of rural Ribbonmen, in the failed conspiracies of the 
past. The radical Irish nationalists, fed on just and real griev-
ance, comforted by similar analysis from the continent. did not 
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feel just rebels. an honorable enough profession. but rather heirs 
to a submerged. oppressed Ireland. They were honorable rebels 
with just cause, legitimate. authorized by the peoples' Will. 
Within them an old Ireland and a new existed, an Ireland yet 
without banners. without an army, without form - a dream. 
They heard trumpets inaudible to the conventional, a call to just 
war. 
On March 17, 1858. James Stephens founded in Dublin 
the Irish Republican Brotherhood. drawing into a single organi-
zation the various strands of radical Irish nationalism then on 
the island . The newIRBwassecret. oath-bound, dedicated to the 
achievement of an Irish Republic already wvirtually established in 
the hearts of men ." The new brotherhood thus possessed a 
superior moral authority to that of the alien, illicit British 
occupier. The Irish people had the right. the duty. the patent 
responsibility to expel the British from Ireland and th us establish 
the Republic . In the IRB there was an organization so dedicated. 
There was now banners including the green -white-and-orange 
tricolor, for the faithful, for the Republic. for Ireland - flags for 
the secret army. And until such time as a risen people on a free 
island might devise other forms. the Supreme Council of the IRB 
was to act as the legitimate government of Ireland. The IRB had 
recognized that the Republican movement must have the moral 
authority, not simply the capacity, to deploy physical force, must 
be accepted as the legitimate vessel for the old Irish dream. The 
form. even the function, of that vessel was of far lesser impor-
tance; in fact. the more detailed the structure the more prospect 
of alienating some of the faithful drawn to a luminous Republic 
. not a sharp -edged, earthly institution of governance. What did 
matter was the need to act. to shape history. In 1858 the 
conspirators. the faithful. the Irish had the IRB. Established 
simultaneously in America, the exile nationalists had the Fenian 
Brotherhood (IFB). In 1858 the greatest immediate asset of the 
IRB appeared, in fact, to be that American diaspora of the IFB 
where grievance festered. where Republican sentiment waxed. 
where skills and resources abounded. Then with organization 
seriously underway in Ireland and in the diaspora. the American 
Civil War imposed something of a recess on conspiracy but 
opened certain possibilities. 
Many Irish immigrants enlisted in the American war. 
mostly on the side of the Union for they resided in the North and 
felt the cause congenial. Despite the mix of motives, many of the 
Irish felt that their military experience could be turned to Irish 
advantage, gain not only the sympathy of the triumphant Union 
government buts more specifically shape an Irish army for use 
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against the British empire. Thus the Fenians under John O'Ma-
hony emerged from the war aware that there were 200,000 lrish-
AIDerican veterans, many dedicated nationalists, an organiza-
tion in the IFB eager to act. and an administration in Washington 
sympathetic to Irish aims . Some of the Fenians felt that O'Ma-
hony was not the man for the Job, too focused on the home island 
when the British were vulnerable in Canada, too fond of the 
centralized organizational structure. 3 In December 1865, the 
organtzation met in Philadelphia, replaced O'Mahony with Wil-
liam Randall Roberts and established a Fenian-democratic Senate 
w1ng. And the militants now looked to Canada. Roberts summed 
up the relation of rebel military success and government. 
If we can get a foothold on which to raise the Irish 
flag we shall be recognized ... A government once 
established, it will have the sympathies of every 
Irishman. Irishmen in every quarter of the land 
seeing that we are working instead of talking, the 
cause will go triumphantly forward ... 4 
And however improbable creating a liberated wne in Canada 
rather than in Ireland. militarily confronting the empire three 
thousand miles from the home island, from a neutral base, the 
scheme had a realistic base. There were limited British military 
resources in Canada and in American the Fenians in theory had 
assets to counter any imperial move. There were tens of thou-
sands of eager Irish veterans. There was money. There were three 
warships purchased at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. President An-
drew Johnson and Secretary of State William Henry Seward 
appeared sympathetic to the venture, prepared to accept a 
Fenian victory in Canada as an accepted fact. 
O'Mahony, who had insisted that the struggle should be 
in Ireland, that the only purpose in a Canadian raid - a mere 
diversion - might be to drag the United States into war with 
England . Yet, the Canada option grew more appealing . O'Mahony, 
who set up his own orthodox brotherhood, loyal to the agenda 
and structure of the IRB in Ireland. but attracting only about ten 
percent of the American Fenians. decided to pre-empt Roberts 
and the Senate wing. His troops would seize the island of Campo 
Bello between Maine and New Brunswick. This raid in April 
1866, the first in a series of Fenian incursions over the next 
several years. failed Just at the time that the Senate wing 
authorized their own invasion across the Niagara River. The 
Fenian force under banners initialed IRA for the Irish Republic 
Army arrived in Canada Just after midnight April 1, 1866; and 
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after serious fighting with hastily assembled British troops 
withdrew in the early hours of June 3. Everything had gone 
wrong. The invasion force had not been properly marshalled. The 
Americans far from sympathetic had closed off access to Canada 
cutting off reinforcements. The Senate wing of the Fenians had 
been penetrated by informers - as had O'Mahony's organJza-
tion. The Canadian Irish. untouched, had remained quiescent. 
The British had been stronger and more effective than antici-
pated. The Campo Bello raid was a fiasco and the second invasion 
spectacular but also a failure. In 1870 a small invasion from St. 
Alba in Vermont, betrayed by an informer. swiftly collapsed. The 
next year in October an invasion force of forty Fenians seized the 
Hudson Bay post of Pembina and were immediately arrested by 
American troops- Washington claimed the area - thus ending 
the Canadian invasions, repeated at Pembina as farce. One of the 
dominant figures of the Fenian movement. an opponent of the 
Canadian option, John Devoy felt that a splendid opportunity 
had been lost to turn the American civil war veterans and the 
Irishmen in the Biitish Army into the "finest fighting forceM in 
Ireland's history. What was needed - a united organization. ably 
and wisely led - had not existed. 
In order to fashion a united organization in the American 
diaspora, Clan na Gael was established in 1867 and gradually 
superceded the Senate wing and the rump Fenian Brotherhood 
of O'Mahony. The Clan recognized the IRB Supreme Council as, 
in fact, the government of Ireland until such time as the people 
oflreland would be free to choose their own form. This IRB Centre 
was not the government-in-exile planned by the Senate wing 
when they invaded Canada seeking to liberate a base from which 
to proclaim the nation, nor within Ireland, it was not an alterna-
tive. if covert, illicit, alternative government to that of the crown. 
It was, rather, an aspect of the IRB claim to represent the Irish 
nation, and so to possess the power to wage war. 5 The IRB in 
Ireland was an almost classical revolutionary conspiracy focused 
on organizing a rising, a traditional insurrection employing 
agents. patriots, conspirators and military men - and as such 
it enjoyed broad if often unarticulated Irish support. As a 
conspiracy the IFB on the island, too, failed to create a united 
organization, ably and wisely led. The Irish 1867 rising failed, 
betrayed by informers, inept planning, British skill. and Irish bad 
luck. In 1867 the IRB as well as the failure of the island rising 
directed two escape attempts in Britain that unwittingly pro-
duced spectacular violence - an attack on a Manchester police 
van carrying a Fenian leader and a fatal explosion at Clerkenwell 
prison in London. Each generated massive publicity. 
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In fact the IRB and the Clan by 1867 had devised a whole 
spectrum of basic revolutionary tactics beyond simple insurrec-
uon: conspiracy, open revolt, assassination, bombing in Britain, 
diplomacy in Europe and America, front organizations, prison 
escapes, songs and ballads and banners, martyrs and patriots 
and always publicity. And the movement was transnational. The 
major IRB leaders - · Thomas Clark Luby, who formulated the 
IRB Oath in 1858, John O'Leary, who wrote for the first Fenian 
publication Phoenix, John Devoy, who directed the infiltration of 
the British army from Ireland and founded the Irish Nation and 
the Gaelic America, Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa. who Joined the 
IRB in 1858 and later financed The Dynamiters as well as John 
O'Mahony and William Randall Roberts of the Canadian inva-
sions - all appeared on the American scene as did the founder 
James Stephens. In fact only Stephens and O'Leary made their 
major contribution in Ireland, for the Fenian center of gravity 
shifted to.American and to the supposedly subordinate Clan after 
1867. In a real sense there was a feeling that an Irish nation had 
-for the time being-spread over both sides of the Atlantic. Not 
a specific, lasting geographic diaspora. a place. the Irish Repub-
lican "diaspora" existed wherever the Irish were denied their 
nation . Ireland as a Republic existed in Fenian hearts, so that 
where they were so too was the nation. In the.American diaspora 
the Fenians were simply on the long road to power, to ensuring 
that the Republic would later be able to take more conventional 
form on the island. To that end Roberts wanted agovernment-in-
ex:ile in Canada as a visible indicator to the direction of history. 
To that end Roberts and O'Mahony invaded Canada just as the 
IRB sought to rise in Ireland and act in Britain. To that end the 
IRB eager to wage war assumed the moral right to do so by 
proclaiming the Supreme Council's right to act as the govern-
ment of Ireland. The only governmental function that the IRB 
pursued, and that erratically as time passed, was to wage war. 
For the Fenians and for the Irish people what was crucial 
was the legitimacy to act bestowed by the existence of the Irish 
Republic in the hearts of all. The form this legitimacy assumed, 
the IRB, the Fenian Brotherhood, the Senate wing, Clan na Gael 
and, more particularly rather than more generally, the Supreme-
Council-as-government or the government-in-exile proposed in 
Canada. was another and lesser matter concerned with means 
and not ends. Mostly, the Fenians focused on means, quarreling, 
dividing, retiring in isolation, bombing in Britain, agitating. 
Always they kept the Republican faith however often the Repub-
lic had to be delayed. however often the dedicated feuded over 
means . In the years after the Canadian adventures, the center of 
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physical force shifted to those in America; the Clan, as events 
within Ireland revealed promising possibilities and new rivals. 
In Ireland the IRB increasingly became a mass movement 
rather than a hidden conspiracy. a broad current competing with 
those focused on Disestablishment, . the land question, educa -
tion, and on. most especially, the Home Rule, a moveme nt under 
Charles Steward Parnell. In 187 4 John Devoy decided on the New 
Departure to support Parnell's Home Rule Movement. Other 
Fenians, later expelled from the orthodox movement, founded 
the Land League to support rural agitation and the New Depar -
ture. Seemingly even the physical force conservatives ha d recog-
nized the changing time in that the new JRB constitution of 1873 
indicated that the Fenians would delay the promised war against 
England until it was endorsed by a majority of the Irish na tion . 
The IRB would henceforth only wage war after some sort of 
plebiscite - an unlikely event. In the meantime Devoy an d the 
IRB would pursue the New Departure. He spent the money from 
O'Donovan Rossa·s Skirmishing Fund intended for terroris m in 
England on the Land League founded by the Fenians Michael 
Davitt, Matt Harris, Patrick Egan and Thomas Brennan. Despite 
the revolutionary rhetoric used by many. at times by Parne ll, and 
the aims of the radicals, the New Departure led to reform within 
the United Kingdom, real enough, not revolution, increas ingly 
the province of the Clan. In Ireland the Fenians evolved into 
respectable, usually retired, rebels admired even by the Church. 
Although violence did not disappear on the island. it was 
sporadic. On May 6, 1882, in Phoenix Park, Dublin, The Invin -
cibles, mostly impatient ex-Fenians, assassinated the new Chief 
Secretary, Lord Frederick Cavendish. and Under -Secretary. T. H. 
Burke. The killings were the most spectacular resort to physical 
force on the island for the remainder of the century with violence 
mostly limited to traditional rural disturbances. 
Elsewhere. however, the faith in physical force ha d not 
been lost and the Clan organized and financed an exte nsive 
dynamite-terror campaign in Britain. Neither dynamite nor 
British concession nor assassins nor Home Rule broug h t the 
Republic any closer . In fact concession and co-option an d the 
promise that sooner or later Home Rule would pass parlia ment 
put an end to many Irish national aspirations, seemingly swept 
away Republican dreams. The Clan in America grew mori bund . 
The IRB awaited a never-heard call to war . Fenian felons eme rged 
to irrelevance and retirement. The Fenian fevers had long, long 
passed even if the currents of nationalism still ran swiftly . 
Cultural nationalism blossomed. On November 1, 1884, 
the Gaelic Athletic Association was founded to encourage tradi -
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uonal Irish sports and former Fenians were among its patrons. 
on August 16. 1892. the National Literary Society was founded; 
and in November Douglas Hyde, later first President oflreland in 
1g38. gave an address "On the Necessity for De-Anglicizing the 
Irish People." Hyde and others founded the Gaelic League on July 
3 1. 1893. to revive the Irish language. The centenary of Wolfe 
Tone's United Irishmen Rising in 1898, a focus for revived IRB 
actiVity. introduced a new generation oflrishmen to the Repub-
lican ideal. So there was movement. then. on the political side as 
well. James Connolly founded the Irish Socialist Republican 
party in 1896. The Ancient Order of Hibernians. part social, part 
political. both pious and nationalist. was revived in American in 
1898 and in Ireland in 1902. In 1905 the radical. Republican 
Dungannon Club. an IRB-front. held its first meeting in Belfast 
in 1905. All of this. harbingers in retrospect. WilliamButlerYeats 
and the Abbey Theater. Patrick Pearse·s Irish-Ireland school St. 
Edna's at Rathfamham in south Dublin, the arrival of the old 
Fenian felon Tom Clarke from the United States in December 
I 907 and the emergence of the Sinn Fein party in 1908, the mix 
and blend of old currents and new. proved important. There had 
already been great excitement during the Anglo-Boer War. Irish 
men. including Major John McBride. husband of Yeat's love 
Maude Gonne, had gone to Africa to fight with the Boers against 
the common British foe. There was more excitement as in Britain 
the conservatives in general and the Tories in particular thwarted 
the natural progress of Home Rule, playing the Orange Card by 
urging Protestants. Unionist in Ireland, to resist - a resistance 
that appeared to even the more moderate Irish to be treasonous. 
Mostly the sensible saw only a new Irish pride. a difficult 
but not impossible Home Rule political problem, a United 
Kingdom with ample room for diversity and an Empire with 
ample opportunity for all ambitions. Dublin opinion. arising in a 
small. intimate city, both elegant and miserable. was more apt to 
be attracted by social and economic agitation- the great strike 
of 1913 led by James Larkin and broken by the weight of 
conservative power - than by any threat from radical national-
ists. Few suspected the revival of the IRB - and few would have 
been concerned other than the British police authorities. Almost 
no one could credit a Fenian-Republican revival. Sinn Fein was 
run by Arthur Griffith using the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as 
a model. Pearse had run his school into debt not into the 
vanguard of a new Ireland. Connolly commanded a tiny. futile 
band of discredited socialist agitators. The cultural nationalists 
quarrelled about aesthetic issues. wrote poems, put on plays. 
Real politics was not the province of old Fenians like Tom Clarke 
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but of the great parties - in Ireland the Parliamentary Party of 
John Redmond - and the great issues - in Ireland how to 
achieve constitutional Home Rule. If the Republic had ever 
existed in the hearts of the Irish, there was by 1914 little real 
evidence that it did so any longer. 
Certainly all the old Fenian institutions had atrophied. 
The Clan had given up dynamite. fallen on evil days, lay quietly. 
The IRB would not move unless the people called. unless Britain 
went to war, such adversity being Ireland's opportunity from the 
time of Tone. The new cultural nationalism - some of the mtnor 
poets to be found even in the IRB - was an appeal to ancient 
Celtic values. shaped for rather than summoned up by contem-
porary purpose. It was rarely atone to Republican aspirations. 
Young lads might engage in burley, speak Irish, attend the 
Abbey. dream Celtic dreams. but the responsible, even the 
simple, rested content. awaited Home Rule. feared Orange 
violence but not Green rebellion. Romantic Fenian Ireland was in 
the grave. 6 And then in August 1914, the United Kingdom went 
to war, a great European war, in time a world war, a war 
absorbing all of the Crown's attention and resources. a war that 
offered the Republicans the prospect of opportunity. 
When the United Kingdom entered the great war, became 
vulnerable, the IRB had as well as opportunity an additional and 
crucial asset. The loyalist opposition to Home Rule had led to a 
near-mutiny of British officers at the Curragh Military camp and 
the organization of illegal gun -running by the militant Ulster 
Volunteer Force. This had been countered by the subsequent 
gun -running into Howth by the Irish Volunteers, formed in 
November 1913 . Private armies had come to Ireland- including, 
even and also, the Irish Citizen Army, founded in November 
1913, by James Connolly . Thus the IRB began discussions ofa 
rising on September 9, 1914, less than a month after the war 
began. The militant established a secret Military Council. Sir 
Roger Casement would contact Germany for aid and the Irish 
Volunteer would be deployed to rise on the cue of the Military 
Committee . In December 1915, the Supreme Council of the IRB 
formally decided on an insurrection. The result was the Easter 
Rising of 1916, the Proclamation of the Republic, by the Military 
Committee including Patrick Pearse. first President of the Re-
public, who had joined the IRB in December 1913. James 
Connolly, to the confusion of subsequent more orthodox social-
ists , as did many of his European colleagues, chose nationalism. 
brought into the Rising his Citizen Army . The Rising was plagued 
by confusion. the failure of Casement's German connection - he 
was captured, tried. and hanged - divisions within the Volun-
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teers. and a swift and brutal Brttish response . Thus the insurrec-
uon was seemingly transformed from a revolt with a real chance 
of success, an opportunity with Germany aid to catch the British 
garrtsons unprepared and seize much of the island, launch a real 
war , 1nto a blood sacrifice so admired in Pearse's poetry and by 
later ballad makers. In any case. in Dublin at least. between April 
24 and 29, there was at last in Ireland a Republic . This Easter 
Republic led not just to glory but also to the gallows for Case-
ment. to a firing squad for all the Proclamation signers and the 
Dublin city military commanders- except Eamon De Valera. an 
American by birth - and to internment in Wales for the rebel 
Volunteers . And there for a generation, it was assumed, matters 
would rest until the next cycle of militancy, until the blood 
sacrifi ce watered a new generation of Irish rebels . 
Even a cursory reading of the Proclamation of the Repub-
lic indicates that for the faithful such an ideal was very real -
"she strikes in full confidence of victory." The ideal, often 
haltingly represented by Fenian institutions, had been made 
tangible in front of the GPO, a spiritual exile, a Republic, home 
at last. focus of a nation once again . The Fenians in exile had 
already pursued war as would any state - even at one point 
appointing a Minister of War. The Supreme Council of the IRB. 
the American Fenians Brotherhoods, Clan na Gael wanted real 
armi es. real ranks and uniforms, wanted a navy - and bought 
three warships, wanted real weapons - and funded the develop-
ment of the submarine. They wanted allies not secret suppliers 
nor covert friends . They spoke not to secret agents but to 
President Johnson in Washington . In 1876 John Devoy and the 
Clan interviewed the Russian Ambassador in Washington only to 
be exposed to Russian realism. " ... you are really a small party: 
you don 't represent Ireland . "7What the Ambassador missed was 
that the faithful did represent Ireland, their Ireland , their Repub-
lic which was to be found not in power or in statistics but in the 
hearts of the Irish . In December 1877, two Clan agents proposed 
to th e Spanish Government a plan to seize Gibraltar - a 
suggestion also rejected by Madrid orthodoxy . In Russian eyes 
the Fenians may have been a small party, not worth alliance in 
the Spanish view, but Fenians assets were real. The invasions 
into Canada had not been all farce. Their dynamite campaign 
was deadly . The murdered were dead. Their war was moral and 
just in their own view. Even when their tactics appalled the 
conventional or alienated their own, the war against Satatic 
England - source of all Irish evils - for a great many Irish 
remained legitimate. just. That was especially so as the Fenian 
fever faded amid the New Departure and the amelioration of 
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grievance and as real violence, as real sacrifices became less 
likely. Then all had been changed, utterly changed. 
The Republic had been proclaimed on Easter Monday, 
1916 . There was a real government, an Irish president, and an 
open, uniformed Irish Republican Army fashioned from the Irish 
volunteers and Citizen Army. Yet by the end of the month, the 
Republic had been returned to an exile, first only in the hearts of 
Irish patriots but within a year in the hearts of the Irish. Rebellion 
did not have to wait another generation but to the surprise of the 
IRB arose across the island. The institutions of rebellion were 
various. There was still the IRB with the Supreme Council's 
governmental pretensions. The Irish Republican Army volun-
teers looked to their Army Executive for authority . The Sinn Fein 
party, with De Valera as president, assembled in October 1917 
all separatist political opinion to run for a Republican Dall 
Eireann using the British general election in December 1918 as 
means. And abroad there was a revived Clan na Gael eager to 
bring America and particular the American Government -
dedicated to the rights of small nations - into the Irish cause. 
In the December 1918 election, Sinn Fein returned 73 
members, the Irish Parliamentary Party 6, the Unionist 25 and 
Independent Unionist one. On April 1, 1919, the Sinn Fein 
members not in jail met as Dail Eireann, reaffirmed the existence 
of the Republic, fashioned a government with De Valera as 
Priomh Aire -President, and then adjourned. They moved 
underground when the Dail was declared illegal on September 
12, 1919. All Dail members were on the run during the Anglo-
Irish struggle between 1919 and 1921. Few seemed greatly 
concerned about the institutions that gave form to the Republic. 
The president in June 1919 left for the United States for eighteen 
months. The IRB continued to exist, dominated by Michael 
Collins who was also Minister of Finance and Commander of the 
IRA. He was not Chief of Staff and the IRA remained loyal to the 
Army Executive. The Dail was in flight, Irish political institutions 
met in secret, courts in barns, ministers in attics. What mattered 
was the Republic existed in real life, whatever the form, home 
from exile. 
The vissitudes of the real contrasted to the ideal Republic 
began only when the British sought by concession to achieve an 
accommodation with militant Irish nationalism. At Westminster 
the British Parliament passed the Government of Ireland Act on 
December 23, 1920, which set up a six-county administration in 
part of historic Ulster, protection for and mean concession to the 
Loyalists . The Act failed as a general solution when the Irish 
rebels continued their guerrilla war . On July 9, 1921,there was 
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a truce between the IRA and the British army. In October . a 
delegation from Dail Eireann. not including De Valera, home 
from America, was welcomed by Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George as a delegation from Sinn Fein. On December 6, the Irish 
delegation signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty and so began an almost 
theological disputation on the nature of the Republic. oflreland. 
and of the appropriate means of governance. Defenders of the 
Treaty. like Collins and GriJiiths. felt Ireland after 800years had 
won much. the freedom to be free. while their opponents felt the 
terms a betrayal of the Republic. On December 14, the Second 
Dail met in Dublin to debate the Treaty. Liam Mellows. a 
Fenian radical. clearly put the Republic's case: the delegation 
had no right to sign away the Republic. 
They had no power to agree to anything inconsis-
tent with the existence of the Republic. Now either 
the Republic exists or it does not. If the Republic 
exists, why are we talking about stepping towards 
the Republic by means of this Treaty? I for one 
believed, and so believe. that the Republic exists. 
because it exists upon the only sure foundation 
upon which any government or republic can 
exist. that is, because the people gave a mandate 
for that Republic to be declared. 8 
The Republic had been proclaimed Easter Monday, transmuted 
from Irish hearts to the streets of Dublin, confirmed by the First 
Dail in 1919, and was beyond the tinkering of the Second Dail or 
the reach of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. De Valera's efforts then and 
later to find a formula to fit the ideal Republic within the 
necessary demands of the British Government were futile. The 
purists could see no need of formulas and the pragmatists found 
his arguments irrelevant. 
On January 7. 1922, the Second Dail approved theAnglo-
Irish Treaty 64 to 57 . Two days later Griffith became President to 
succeed De Valera, president not of the Republic but of the 
Provisional Government. Gradually. imperceptibly, inevitably 
the country slipped toward civil war. Just as the Irish had 
between 1918 and 1921 evolved the arch type for all subsequent 
national liberation struggles, the asymmetrical Juxtaposition of 
the people's will against imperial power. so too did they indicate 
the cost of transforming the dream into the everyday. the ideal 
into institutions. The ensuing civil war was more costly. more 
painful than the previous struggle, the Tan War. 
The devout Republicans. the purists. felt that the Dail 
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could not vote away the real Republic. the people in De Valera's 
words, had no right to do wrong. The faithful members of the 
Second Dail, thus felt they were the real and legitimate govern-
ment of Ireland - even though Republicans stood in the Third 
Dail elections- not to advantage. The IRA loyal to its Executive 
still dedicated to the Republic of 1916 confirmed by the First Dail 
fought against what evolved into the army of the Irish Free State. 
The IRA lost the confused and irregular civil war. dumped arms 
and waited for a better day. Sinn Fein deserted by the Free State 
attenuated by the political confusion and the results of the Dail 
election, with De Valera as president remained loyal to the 
Republic. And De Valera, president of Sinn Fein, President of the 
Republic, recognized by the Second Dail, pragmatist at the end 
left his party, the tyranny of the dead. the legacy of the blood 
sacrifice, and formed Fianna Fail . In time he took it into the Free 
Stale Dail . 1:'he real Republicans, who believed in a tangible ideal, 
a dream too luminous to deny, remained in exile within the 
nation in the IRA or Sinn Fein or the Second Dail. 
In foreign exile the Fenians had fashioned only those 
institutions that would permit the faithful to wage moral war 
against the British. Few cared very much about the form- only 
diligent investigation can unearth much evidence of a serious 
government-in -exile although ample example of moral justifica-
tion for physical force . When the Republicans in 1923 went into 
internal exile and rapidly increasingly political irrelevance the 
existing forms for Republican remembrance - Sinn Fein. the 
Second Dail handful of faithful. the IRA. a secret army with 
limited arms and no ideas as much dedicated to past grievance 
as future action - were more convenience. heritage, than 
consciously shaped structures of internal, covert opposition to 
the Free State and the United Kingdom . The faithful continued 
to believe that the Republic. the dream.did exist. required their 
loyalty, their service. and even at times their lives. The other 
Ireland seized on the every day, milk prices, postage stamps, 
elections . and promotion , existed on a lesser if real level. The 
Republicans might at times eschew deserved pensions or govern-
ment employment - or were so denied - but sent their children 
to school, rode the buses, mailed their letters with the Free State 
stamps . They, the faithful went about their business in a country 
that after 1932 had De Valera and Fianna Fail in power. in power 
at least for twenty ©six counties, in power after the 1937 
Constitution of a Eire-Ireland but not in control of the Republic. 
And all the while their loyalty was tothe Republic, more real than 
real. a compelling. luminous dream held in the hearts of internal 
exiles. In 1938 the few remaining Republican members of the 
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second Dail gave their moral right to rule to the IRA Army Council 
to add additional authority to the forthcoming bombing cam-
paign in Britain . After the war - the remaining Republicans 
mostly spent the years interned at the Curragh military camp in 
county Kildare - the tiny IRA absorbed the equally tiny and 
1rrelevant Sinn Fein merging for no great purpose all the insutu-
tions that had retained the faith. On Easter Monday 1949, the 
coalition government of old Free Staters and tamed Republicans 
declared Ireland a Republic. It was not a united thirty-two 
country Republic, not a real Republic. The faithful ignored the 
maneuver. In theory- and for the old generation in reality- the 
government of Ireland still rested within the IRA Army Council, 
chosen at a democratic Army Convention by the twelve-man 
elected Army Executive. When the Troubles came to Northern 
Ireland in 1969 and the IRA split. the Provisional IRA, then loyal 
to abstentionism (the refusal to recognize the puppet institutions 
of the Dail in Leinster House and the Northern provincial 
parliament at Stormont) assumed the pure Republican mantle. 
The Provisional Army Convention met but twice, the Army 
Executive from time to time, so that the government-in-internal 
exile came to rest with the Army Council. 
The Provisional IRA Army Council, pragmatists, hard 
men with decades of secret war as experience. by the eighties. 
had little interest in the old theological arguments of the Second 
Dail or the abstentionists. The last of those faithful to the past 
principles left to form Republican Sinn Fein after the JRA Army 
Convention in 1985 voted to end abstenUonism- a tactic. They 
do still care, Just as have each generation of Irish rebels, about 
their moral right to deploy physical force in the name of the 
Republic . The Fenians sought not to government but to wage 
war.Just war, war for an ideal held in Irish hearts that proffered 
moral superiority to evil England . And so they did. The volunteers 
of 1916 inherited this legitimacy and briefly made manifest in 
Ireland the elusive Republic, created a liberated zone in Dublin, 
in Irish hearts. Their immediate successors in the IRA, in the 
Dail. in the Tan War, had acted for the Republic declared on April 
24, 1916 . All these institutions were focused on maintaining an 
Irish independence denied by imperial pretensions as much as 
achieving freedom. Ireland was free. Ireland was a Republic. And 
when the Anglo Irish Treaty presented less than the dream, the 
idealists insisted on pursuing an uncompromising course, be-
yond formula, beyond realization. After the turmoil of the civil 
war. the IRA had the prospect of action but as the assets wasted, 
after De Valera left, when the old soldiers retired, when the Free 
States and then Eire-Ireland grew too real and Northern Ireland 
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too secure. increasingly the institutions in intemal-e x:ile were 
not so much subversive as persistent, witness not a conspiracy . 
In all the various visible, often viable forms. the essenc e of ex:ile 
had always been the necessity of moral sanction that an ideal 
Republic offered believers - Fenians bombers. Irish Volunteers 
IRA guerrillas, and today's Provisional gunmen. The orgaruza~ 
tional. institutional. and theological facets of the visible institu-
tions may-and did-fascinate the analytical but not th ose with 
guns. What they needed, what they received was sanctio n to act 
to wage war, to def end the dream in being, to deny lesse; 
alternatives, to persist 
For analytical purposes an Irish government- in -exile. 
external or internal, has always had a small role. As soon as 
possible. in April 1919, the Irish rebels simply forme d a "real" 
government and validated the Republic declared in 1916 but long 
present in Irish hearts. Before and after the Tan War. Dails, only 
a few were interested in fashioning institutions of governance . 
The Irish Republic never gave rise to a mirror-image of the 
conventional except in 1919-1922. There were no shad ow cabi-
nets or search for formal recognition. The Fenians wanted 
Russian or Spanish aid in waging war, Sir Roger Case ment 
wanted German arms to aid the insurrection. Today the Provi-
sional IRA want Libyan arms rather than recogniti on as a 
government of internal exile. Recognition of the Irish caus e was 
always sought, of Irish rights, Irish Republican legitimac y -
always and particularly in America where. then and previ ously , 
the Irish diaspora promises much. And a whole spectru m of 
means have been there employed - machine politics, new 
myths, spectacular operations abroad. petitions and pres sure, 
direct mail campaigns and access to the president. The nee d for 
a "government" never seems to have been pressing. In any event 
from the founding of the Fenian Brotherhood. the diaspora has 
been the arena for splits and schism, ideological qua rrels, 
personal vendettas. real divisions and those contrived by the 
Jealous. A practical step was to avoid the creation of a "govern-
ment" that might engender more opposition than su pport. 
Always the Republic attracted more volunteers to a single, 
compelling vision, transcendental not quantifiable. not pieced 
out in policies and issues and specifics. in all the necessary day-
to-day promises. Everyone could be a Fenian. a Republica n . 
Until 1916 the need was to wage war. After 1916 with th e 
creation of the First Dail, the Republic really existed and only the 
Tan War ameliorated disputation within the parties of the fait hful 
so debilitating in the American diaspora. The response to the 
problem met with a particularly Irish response- the institutio n-
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ali.Zation of vagary . Just as members of the IRB rarely referred to 
their organization by name - the firm, The Triangle - the Dail 
was as vague in Ireland about form and future and policies as had 
been the Republicans in exile. The most important facet of the 
Dail was that it was the elected Dail of the Republic. More was not 
needed even when more was achieved - Republican courts in 
the country or Soviet Russian recognition in Moscow. Then after 
the civil war and the desertion of De Valera. the Republicans in 
internal-exile found no need - or possibility- of really govem -
1ng. They sought and possessed in their eyes and those of many 
of the Irish the rtght to do so at some future moment if the people 
acquiesced and in the meantime the IRA could use force. 
particularly against the British crown, to further the Republican 
cause . 
In effect the Irish experience indicates that what matters 
is the reality of the dream. Exiles must carry more than files and 
rubber stamps in their baggage. must find more than arms to 
return their emigre regime to control. Thus De Gaulle and his 
Free French grew legitimate in time with the rising prospect of 
Allied success and the declining inevitability of a Thousand Year 
Reich : and with the alienation of the home French population in 
response to the German occupation arrogance they became 
France . In time De Gaulle himself alone for many embodied 
France . Later he could institutionalize himself in a new 
constitution : but in 1940. he represented. almost alone at first, 
a dream of a Free France - a dream once caught. once spread 
that transformed his pretentions into reality. The faith of the 
Afghanistan mujahedin could focus only on agreed opposition to 
the alien. Russian occupier . After the Russians withdrew confu -
sion began . On most matters there is almost no unity. at best only 
tolerance and recourse to local opposition . The mujahedin have 
never felt a compelling need for moral justification in waging war 
or for a central government. The Palestinians. in fact. waged an 
irregular war by various means including terror in order to 
fashion a national dream. Once Palestine had been summoned 
up. the PLO was taxed to find further means to act as the years 
passed . And then the leadership was challenged to provide 
direction - uleadership" - when resistance was spontaneously 
snatched by children throwing rocks. In 1989. then . a Palestine 
government -in-exile was declared in part to capture their own in 
the occupied zone. in part to move history at a faster pace . in part 
to present an effective outward face to the dream- and thus in 
part to avoid relegation to exile futility . In all three cases the 
ugovemment" but haltingly represented the dream - De Gaulle 
as France. the mujahedin as a quarreling committee united by 
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mutual suspicions. and the PW as classic. exile bureaucrats 
rushing their banner to the head of the parade. All are surely 
typical cases. each expressing in tangible form the dream. In 
Ireland more than in most nations. the dream not only inspires 
but also authorizes the moral use of violence - without this, the 
validating blast of invisible trumpets. IRA murder is simply 
murder - a view strongly and mistakenly held by Brttish Prtme 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. With the validating of the dream. all 
Irtsh institutions become transient. all Brttish power a legitimate 
target. Dreams. of course, regardless oftheirmatertal form, have 
always proven difficult of analysis, beyond quantification. Yet, in 
revolutionary matters such dreams move history. 
For a great many people, Irtsh men and women of this and 
other generations, the Republic. the ideal, is and has been as real 
as real, requires action as well as acceptance, endows armies and 
men with a legitimacy not easy to transfer, not easy to transfer 
even to a recognized government, a real state. elected officials, 
the orthodox institutions. It is even possible from time to time to 
see this dream. the Republican validation, plain in its effect on 
the faithful. One of the most compelling rttuals in Ireland 
presently is an IRA funeral. There along some parish lane or in 
the Milltown Cemetery in Belfast for one shining moment, as the 
procession straggles forward behind a lone piper and the coffin 
covered by trtcolor, theory becomes fact. Standing at the graveside, 
the shattered family, the crowd of everyday people of no property, 
red necked and rumpled, motley, damp, and the honor guard of 
nervous young men, together watch a quickly snatched volley. 
Pistol shots hastily fired by a masked volunteers proffers the 
Republic's only honor, hastily, illegal, compelling. There, at the 
grave of one more of Pearse's patriot dead, a volunteer dead for 
the Republic, the dream is real and the nature of any form, any 
government in external or internal exile irrelevant. And it would 
appear that as long as that dream lives so too will the invisible 
Republic inspirtng war, inspirtng at time, perhaps, forms more 
amenable to analysis but always indicating the necessary reality 
of faith behind revolutionary practice and structure. 
-The author wishes to thank the Harry Frank Guggen-
heim and Smith-Richardson Foundations for grants to pursue 
research on Irtsh revolutionary movements. 
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FOOTNOTES 
'Patriot history has played an enormous part in shaping 
the ideology, assumptions and even agenda of the Irish Repub-
lican movement- and has been the standard version of the state 
until most recently. The impact of the present Northern Troubles 
has inspired not only an analysis of the ocntinuing violence but 
also the reality of past assumptions. On many of the most 
1mportant nodes of concentration the Jury is still out, even the 
facts remain uncertain so that even as elegant a work as RF. 
Foster's recent Modem Ireland 1600-1972 must skim swiftly 
over bogs of controversy. 
21n consciously fashioning Irish national ideology during 
the nineteenth century a narrowing of the term excluded those 
"less~ Irish producing the single tradition - Catholic, Gaelic 
speaking, Celtic in culture, older and more island bound- that 
has caused so much contemporary difficulty. The Republicans in 
theory, if not always in practice, remained true to their non-
sectarian tradition and point with pride to Irish Protestant 
Republicans (few on the ground at present since the Provisional 
IRA often arises from very traditional roots and real sectarian 
conflict). 
3As a general rule revolutionary organizations for various 
inherent reasons tend to be divided - those who stay together 
ossify together - but Irish Republicanism has been especially 
prone to schism. One reason is that the variety strands do not 
knit easily- in particular the radical, secular continental ideas 
with more narrow. highly consetvative parish nationalism. Pres-
ently, for example, there are the Provisional movement- heirs 
to all including schism, the Workers Party on the left. the only 
new Stalinist socialist party in Europe and once, long ago, the 
Official IRA, the Republican Sinn Fein, seized on the verities o 
inherited principles, and the small, competing bands of gunmen 
left after the collapse of the Irish Republican Socialist Party that 
managed to unite the strands only briefly through the charissma 
of the founder Seamus Costello. 
4Brendan O'Cathaoir. "American Fenians and Canada.~ 
The Irish Sword. Vol. vm. No. 31, Winter 1967. pp. 79-80. 
5Although there is an enormous literature on the Fenians 
- the generic term for nineteenth century Irish rebels- if not yet 
a definitive work, little is focussed on the nature of any govern-
ment-in-exile. It was not very important to the involved and has 
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not been at all important to historians. 
6A revolutionary ritual is the gravesite oration , a crucial 
step in the martyr pattern . The most important such spee ch in 
modem Irish history was that given at Glasnevin by Pear se over 
the grave of O'Donovan Rossa indicating the general tran quility 
of the nation and the Republican insistence that the cru cial 
elements for rebellion, nevertheless. existed . All rebe ls spend 
much of their political life waiting for the golden mome n t to rise 
and most do so possessed of almost criminal optimism. 
Life springs from death: and from the graves of 
patriot men and women spring living nations. The 
Defenders of this Realm have worked in secret 
and in the open. They think that they have 
pacified Ireland. They think that they have fore-
seen everything, think that they have provided 
against everything; but the fools. the fools, the 
fools! - they have left us our Fenian dead, and 
while Ireland holds these graves. Ireland unfree 
shall never be a peace. 
7Sean Cronin, Irish Nationalism, A History of Its Roots and 
Ideology, Dublin, The Academy Press, 1980, p. 92. 
8Cronin, Irish Nationalism. p. 147. 
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